Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, &
Natural Resources Law
Volume 5

Issue 2

Article 10

2013

A Constitutional "Inquiry" into the Texas Racing Act: The Physical
Presence Requirement for Wagering & the Dormant Commerce
Clause
Amanda Stubblefield
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kjeanrl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Gaming Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Stubblefield, Amanda (2013) "A Constitutional "Inquiry" into the Texas Racing Act: The Physical Presence
Requirement for Wagering & the Dormant Commerce Clause," Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, &
Natural Resources Law: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kjeanrl/vol5/iss2/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law by an authorized editor of
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

A CONSTITUTIONAL "INQUIRY" INTO THE TEXAS RACING
ACT: THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENT FOR
WAGERING & THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
AMANDA STUBBLEFIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the commercial Internet, there came a
fundamental transformation in the United States' economy.' In 2010, "ecommerce grew faster on a year-to-year percentage change basis than total
economic activity." 2 This growth in e-commerce also holds true in the
horseracing industry. Advance deposit wagering (ADW) is the fastest
growing segment of pari-mutuel wagering. ADW is a mechanism for
betting on horse races where individuals place funds into an account and
"wager via telephone, mobile device, or through the Internet.' With ADW
comprising a larger portion of the betting industry, companies are more
aware of the importance of offering their ADW systems to as many
potential customers as possible.
Despite its market share, not everyone is willing to accept the
ascendance of ADW so easily. Companies operating ADW systems must
navigate inconsistent state regulations. These regulations vary - with

different state regulations banning online gambling completely, permitting
all forms of online gambling, banning online gambling with exceptions for
pari-mutuel wagering, banning online pari-mutuel wagering and permitting
only bets placed at an actual racetrack, and having unclear regulations
requiring ADW operators to roll the dice.5 The convergence of complex
legal analyses further complicates this growing market. Challenges to a
* Notes Editor, Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Law 20132014; J.D. expected May 2014, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. in History, summa cum
laude, May 2011, Eastern Kentucky University. The author would like to thank Terrence Theetge for
reinvigorating her interest in the horseracing industry.
1ROBERT D. ATKINSON ET AL., THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE INTERNET
ECONOMY 25 YEARS AFTER .COM: TRANSFORMING COMMERCE AND LIFE (2010), available at
http://www.itif.org/files/2010-25-years.pdf.
2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU E-STATS (2012), available at

http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2010/2010reportfinal.pdf.
3

4 CHURCHILL DowNS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM

id.

10-K) 6, (2008).

5ERIC SINDLER, HARNESS TRACKS OF AM., RULES AND REGULATIONS: ADVANCE DEPOSIT
WAGERING IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2010), available at http://ua-rtip.org/sites/uartip.org/files/adw-rules andregulations.pdf
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state law that regulates gambling on the Internet can culminate in a
multitude of potential legal quandaries, including: constitutional issues; the
perplexity of applying legal doctrines to the Internet; and federalism
concerns. Legal scholars have often said that the Dormant Commerce
Clause, when combined with state laws that regulate the Internet, is "a
nuclear bomb of legal theory." 6 This statement is particularly true when the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Internet, and the traditional state police
power to regulate gambling converge.
There is an industry-wide trend of decreasing track attendance.'
Churchill Downs, Inc. suggested in 2007 that "over 80% of pari-mutuel
handles bet at off-track locations," including ADW channels.' This industry
shift signals the growing importance of off-track handles. On September 21,
2012, Churchill Downs Inc., doing business as Twinspires.com, filed a
lawsuit in federal court against the Executive Director and other members
of the Texas Racing Commission seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from the in-person wagering requirement of the Texas Racing Act, arguing
it is an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause.9
Part I of this note discusses the various federal laws which relate to
online pari-mutuel wagering. Part II outlines the Commerce Clause and its
dormant application. Parts III and IV provide an in-depth examination of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and its application in cases
involving the Internet and gambling. Part V demonstrates the convergence
of these complex legal analyses in Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout. Finally,
Part VI recommends a proper resolution to the Churchill Downs case and
proposes a course for future regulation of the horseracing industry and parimutuel wagering.
II. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW
There are three major federal laws that directly relate to Internet
pari-mutuel gambling. These laws include the Interstate Wire Act of 1961,
the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, and the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006. Although the industry has long called for
clarification of these laws, and despite several attempts by Congress to
amend legislation, uncertainty continues.' 0

6 Declan McCullagh, Brick by Brick, NETLY NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 31,
1997),
https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups-#!topic/alt.cyberspace/0x0cUPuKOSA.
Racetrack
Attendance
Plummeting,
NPR
(May
2,
2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90142692.
8 CHURCHILL DOWNS, INC., supra note 3, at 15.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, et al., No.
12CV00880 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 4485999, at 11.
'oSee H.R. Res. 5599, 11 Ith Cong. (2010); H.R. Res. 2702, 112th Cong. (2011).
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A. The Interstate Wire Act of 1961
The first of these federal laws, the Interstate Wire Act of 1961
(Wire Act) could prove disastrous for ADW operators. Congress intended
the Wire Act to assist states with "the enforcement of their laws pertaining
to gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses and to aid in the suppression of
organized gambling activities."" The Wire Act provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or
wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets
or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.12
On September 20, 2011 the Department of Justice released a
Memorandum Opinion that concluded "interstate transmissions of wire
communications that do not relate to a 'sporting event or contest' fall
outside the reach of the Wire Act."13 Despite the Department's intention to
clarify the issues surrounding the Wire Act as it relates to lotteries, the
Department further complicated the legal issues surrounding other forms of
online gambling, including pari-mutuel wagering. The horseracing industry
interprets the Wire Act as inapplicable to pari-mutuel betting.14 However,
the Department of Justice disagrees.15 Throughout the memorandum, offtrack betting on horseracing is referred to as Congress' principal focus in
enacting the Wire Act.1 These references suggest the Department of Justice
would find the transmission of wire communications for the purpose of
betting on a horse race illegal under the Wire Act. Nevertheless, the Wire

"H.R. Rep. No. 87-967, at 2631 (1961).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1961).
13VIRGINIA A. SEITZ, MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL,

CRIMINAL DivISION 1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/201 1/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf.
14Ron Mitchell, Opinion Opens Door to More Internet Gambling, BLOODHORSE (Dec. 28,

2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/66721/opinion-opens-door-to-moreinternet-gambling.

" Wire Act - IHA Clarification Introduced, AM. HORSE COUNCIL (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.horsecouncil.org/legislation/wire-act-iha-clarification-introduced.
16SEITZ, supra note 13, at 8.
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Act contains a provision excluding legal pari-mutuel wagering from the
purview of the Act." 18 USC § 1084(b) provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of
information ... for the transmission of information assisting

in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or
contest from a State or foreign country where betting on
that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign
country in which such betting is legal.' 8
Therefore, the Wire Act should not be an obstacle for ADW operators or
persons who wish to wager on horse races, as long as the interstate wager
both originates and is received in states that permit such activity.
B. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
It has been suggested that the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) makes Internet pari-mutuel wagering
illegal.' 9 However, it is clear from the statutory text, which provides "the
term 'unlawful internet gambling' shall not include any activity that is
allowed under the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978," that Congress did
not intend for the UIGEA to have any effect upon pari-mutuel wagering.2 0
C. The InterstateHorseracingAct of 1978
The Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (IHA) was enacted in order
to "regulate interstate commerce with respect to wagering on horseracing,"
with the express intention to "further the horseracing & legal off-track
betting industries in the United States." 21 The EIHA requires the consent of
the host racing commission, host racing association, and off-track racing
commission, and further requires compliance with a state's laws in order for
the acceptance of an interstate off-track wager to be legal.22 As long as
ADW operators comply with these requirements, the IHA explicitly permits
interstate pari-mutuel wagers via telephone or other electronic media.

" United States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334 (8th Cir. 2007) (using 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) as an
exception to criminal liability for participating in pari-mutuel wagering under the Wire Act).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (1961).
19Alex Waldrop, Working For Players in Washington, BLOODHORSE (June 27, 2010, 12:09
PM),
http://cs.bloodhorse.comf/blogs/ntra-alex-waldrop-straight-up/archive/2010/06/27/working-forplayers-in-washington.aspx.
20 31 U.S.C. § 5362(D)(i) (2006).
2115 U.S.C. § 3001(b) (1978).
22 15 U.S.C. § 3004(a) (1978).
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III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. Commerce Power Generally
Article 1, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."23 The Commerce Clause has long been one of
Congress' main sources of power, allowing it to regulate many activities
and create federal crimes. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce
Clause "not only bestows powers upon Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, but also limits the powers of the states to erect barriers against
interstate trade." 24
Although Congress' Commerce power is plenary, the item or
activity to be regulated must actually be "commerce" in order to be subject
to Congress' power.25 In the Supreme Court's first major case examining
the Commerce Clause, Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court defined "commerce" as
"intercourse" 26 and found the power "is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the Constitution."27 In Champion v. Ames, the Court held
Congress' commerce power included the ability to prohibit the interstate
transportation of lottery tickets.28 Additionally, courts have extended the
Court's reasoning to find Congress has the ability to "prohibit all interstate
transmission of wagers." 29 The Supreme Court has also held state and local
actions are "within the domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden
interstate commerce or impede its free flow." 30
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has construed the Commerce Clause to prohibit
state laws and regulations which burden interstate commerce, even in the
absence of congressional action. The Court has interpreted the dormant
Commerce Clause as serving the Commerce Clause's "purpose of
preventing a state from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing
the welfare of the Nation as a whole, as it would do if it were free to place
burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly
Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
25 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1
(1824).
26 Id at
4.
27 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 347 (1903) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
1
23 U.S.
24

(1824)).

8

Id. at 328.
E.g., Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1968).
3o C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).
29
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within those borders would not bear."31 Further, the Supreme Court has
found the construction of the Commerce Clause to create a "dormant"
doctrine reflecting the Framers' "conviction that in order to succeed, the
new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued the relations among the Colonies and later
among the states under the Articles of Confederation."32
After establishing an item or activity is subject to Congress'
commerce power, it is subject to two threshold inquiries. First, is whether
federal law has made permissible the state or local law's discriminatory
impact on interstate commerce. 3 The state or local government has a high
burden in proving its law is exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny.3 4
Courts require that "Congress must manifest its unambiguous intent before
a federal statute will be read to permit or to approve such a violation of the
Commerce Clause." 3 5 A mere reference to the states' ability to regulate,
without something in the "statute or legislative history evincing a
congressional intent to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by
the Commerce Clause," would likely be insufficient to meet this burden.
The Supreme Court has stated, "absent a 'clear expression of approval by
Congress, any relaxation in the restrictions on state power otherwise
imposed by the Commerce Clause unacceptably increases 'the risk that
unrepresented interests will be adversely affected by restraints on
commerce."' 37
The second threshold inquiry is whether in-state and out-of-state
interests are "similarly situated for constitutional purposes." 38 The Supreme
Court has stated, "any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of
substantially similar entities." 3 9 If the in-state and out-of-state entities
"provide different products" there may be a lack of competition between
the entities. 40 Thus, there "can be no local preference, whether by express
discrimination against interstate commerce, or undue burden upon it, to
which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply."4 ' Therefore, if the legal
distinction is based on different types of "business forms" and not on
domicile, the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply.4 2
31 Okla.

Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995).
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
3 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 457 (1992).
3 See Id at 456 (describing the burden on the state to show the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives).
" Id. at 458.
36 Id.
3 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984)).
3 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).
39
Id. at 298.
40
Id at 300.
41 id.
42 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 162 (5th Cir. 2007).
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The main inquiry under the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is
whether the state or local law is discriminatory. If the law is discriminatory,
it will be subjected to the "strictest scrutiny." 43 If the court finds the law
non-discriminatory, the law is subject to a lesser scrutiny focused on
whether the "burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits." 44
A local or state law is unconstitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause "where it discriminates against interstate commerce
either facially, by purpose or by effect." 45 State or local laws that
discriminate against interstate commerce face a "virtually per se rule of
invalidity." 46 When a statute affirmatively discriminates, a state must
"demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose and that
this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means." 47 This is a high burden for state and local governments to
overcome because "in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws
violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate differential treatment of instate and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter."A4
The burden of establishing that a law is discriminatory falls on the
party challenging the statute. 4 9 For a statute to be discriminatory on its face,
the text must "facially benefit in-state interests over out-of-state interests or
give some benefit to intrastate companies that it does not give to interstate
companies." 50 However, even a facially neutral statute can be
discriminatory in its purpose or effect.51
A law enacted with the intent to discriminate against out-of-state
interests is discriminatory.5 2 The Supreme Court directs courts to perform
"an independent assessment of the asserted purpose" behind legislation in
their analyses. 53 Most courts will look to both "direct and indirect evidence
to determine whether a state adopted a statute with a discriminatory
purpose."5 4 Several circuit courts have adopted the equal protection analysis
from Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development

4 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).
4 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
45Allstate Ins. Co., 495 F.2d 160; see also Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270
(1984).
46City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
47Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
48Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
49See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).

5oTranscon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. La. Tax Comm'n, 32 So.3d 199, 209 (La. 2010).
s' See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 2007).
5

See id.

s3Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 137 (1978).
54E.g., Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1269 (8th Cir. 2006).
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Corp. to determine whether a state's legislature acted with discriminatory
intent.55 The four Arlington Heights factors are:
(1) [W]hether a clear pattern of discrimination emerges
from the effect of the state action, (2) the historical
background of the decision, which may take into account
any history of discrimination by the decision-making body,
(3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision, including departures from normal
procedures, and (4) the legislative or administrative history
of the state action, including contemporary statements by
decision-makers.s6
Additionally, some courts require a party to show a "relationship between
the proffered evidence and the challenged statute" where a party presents
"circumstantial evidence of an allegedly discriminatory purpose." 5 7 The
Fifth Circuit has held "stray protectionist remarks of certain legislators are
insufficient" to demonstrate discriminatory intent.s Thus, to prove a law
was enacted with discriminatory purpose in the Fifth Circuit, a party must
present significant circumstantial evidence and show the effect of the
evidence on the challenged law.
A statute can also be discriminatory if it has the practical effect of
"favoring in-state interests over out-of-state interests."59 Courts require the
challenging party to make a "substantial showing" to prove discriminatory
effect.60 In addition, the Sixth Circuit has held that to prove a law has a
discriminatory effect, the party "must show both how local economic actors
are favored by the legislation and how out-of-state actors are burdened by
the legislation."61 To satisfy this "substantial showing" the Ninth Circuit
found neither the "mere fact that a statutory regime has a discriminatory
potential" nor "a de minimis benefit to in-state companies" would be
sufficient to subject a law to strict scrutiny.62 The Supreme Court has held,
"the fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate
companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against

s Allstate Ins. Co., 495 F.3d 160; see Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316,
336 (4th Cir. 2001).
'6Allstate Ins. Co., 495 F.3d 160.
" Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 39 (2005); E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court
ofMagoffin Cnty., 127 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 1997).
" Allstate Ins. Co., 495 F.3d 161.
5 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 (2005).
6 E.g., Black Star Farms v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2010).
61 Cherry Hill Vineyards, L.L.C. v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation
marks omitted).
62Black Star Farms, L.L.C., 600 F.3d 1235.
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interstate commerce."63 Although, if the "effect of a state regulation is to
cause local goods to constitute a larger share and goods with an out-of-state
source to constitute a smaller share" of the market, there may be a
discriminatory effect.6
However, the Supreme Court has held that "where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."6 If a law is not discriminatory and
still indirectly burdens interstate commerce, a state or local government is
still required to justify the law, but is subject to lesser scrutiny.6 6
In Pike v. Bruce Church the Supreme Court held that a state or
local government must advance a "legitimate local purpose" to justify a
statute that burdens interstate commerce. 67 A state or local government
could advance any one of a multitude of legitimate reasons for passing a
law. The Supreme Court has adopted a general reluctance to challenge the
discretion of lawmakers to determine the usefulness of legislation. 6
Therefore, a court should give due regard to the "local benefit" lawmakers
advance "so long as an examination of the evidence before or available to
the lawmaker indicates that the regulation is not wholly irrational in light of
its purposes."6 9
After a legitimate local purpose is found, "the question becomes
one of degree." 70 Such analysis requires a case-by-case balancing of the
benefits of unimpeded interstate commerce against the legitimate purpose
advanced by the state or local government. 7 1 The Supreme Court has held
the "extent of the burden that will be tolerated will ... depend on the nature
of the local interest involved." 72 Thus, this lesser degree of scrutiny requires
the state or local government to show the "local benefits [are] ample to
support" the legislature's decision and there is "no approach with a lesser
impact on interstate activities." 7 3 If the law satisfies the two requirements of
the Pike v. Bruce Church test, it will be upheld despite its incidental
burdens on interstate commerce. 74
63 Exxon
64

Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S.1 17, 126 (1978).

Id. at n. I6.

65 Pike

v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).

66Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 306 (1997).
67 Pike, 397

U.S. 142.

68See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (quoting
Kassel v.

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981)).
69 Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 680-81 (1981) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
'oPike, 397 U.S. 142.
71 id.
72 Id.
n Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981).
74 See Pike, 397 U.S. 137.
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IV. THE INTERNET & THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The "borderless world" of the Internet has a peculiar way of
complicating established legal doctrines, causing lawmakers and jurists to
seek guidance in crafting legislation. American Libraries Association v.
Pataki,a district court opinion, has become the leading case on Internet and
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 7 The Court in American
Libraries determined that the Internet is subject to Congress' interstate
commerce authority, qualifying as an area of "commerce that must be
marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent
legislation that, taken to its extreme, could paralyze development of the
Internet altogether."7 7 The New York law at issue in American Libraries
prohibited a person from:
Knowing the character and content of the communication
which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated
nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and
which is harmful to minors, to intentionally use any
computer communication system allowing the input,
output, examination or transfer, of computer data or
computer programs from one computer to another, to
initiate or engage in such communication with a person
who is a minor. 78
The court enjoined enforcement of the law after finding it would be
"impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act to conduct occurring
within New York" and thus found a per se violation of the Commerce
Clause.79 The court further stated "even if the Act were not a per se
violation of the Commerce Clause . .. [it] would nonetheless be an invalid
indirect regulation of interstate commerce, because the burdens it imposes
on interstate commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefits it
confers."o In finding the statute failed the Pike v. Bruce Church test, the
court made a strong statement about the protection the Internet deserves as
an instrumentality of commerce. Although the Court conceded protecting
children from pedophilia is a "quintessentially legitimate" state interest, the
court found the Act would result in an "extreme burden on interstate

7s Am.
76 Jack

Libraries Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.160, 168 (1997).
L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110

YALE L.J. 785, 786 (2001).
n Am. LibrariesAssoc., 969 F. Supp. 160, 169.
78
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1967).
7 Am. LibrariesAssoc., 969 F. Supp. 160.
80 Id.
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commerce."' Furthermore, before concluding and granting the injunction,
the court echoed concerns about the singular nature of the Internet,
necessitating "uniform national treatment and bar[ring] the states from
enacting inconsistent regulatory schemes." 82
Since American Libraries, several jurisdictions elected to follow
the court's reasoning. 8 However, this trend has not been universal. 84
Although the opinion in American Libraries stressed that the Internet is
"wholly insensitive to geographical distinctions," the maturation of geolocation technologies and the consequent reduction of burdens placed on
interstate commerce from varying state Internet regulations mark a change
in Internet commerce clause scholarship. 86 Despite this, courts have
appeared relatively willing to strike down state laws that regulate the
Internet as unconstitutional violations of the Commerce Clause.
V. GAMBLING & THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Despite their general distaste for state Internet regulations, courts
have consistently supported the power of states to regulate interstate
gambling via their police powers. When applying the dormant Commerce
Clause to state police powers, courts have attempted to strike a proper
balance with federalism concerns. 87 The Supreme Court stated the
"limitation upon state power" through the dormant Commerce Clause is not
absolute, and the "states retain authority under their general police powers
to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern' even though interstate
commerce may be affected."8 8 Nevertheless, the Court was careful to note
that "however important the state interest at hand, 'it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from

8

82

Id. at 177-179.

Id. at 184.

E.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (invalidating under the dormant
Commerce Clause a New Mexico statute criminalizing dissemination by computer of materials harmful
to minors); Cyberspace Commc'ns, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (invalidating
under the dormant Commerce Clause a Michigan statute criminalizing the use of computers to distribute
sexually explicit materials to minors); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2000)
(enjoining enforcement of a Virginia pornographic communication law at the preliminary injunction
stage, in part on dormant Commerce Clause grounds).
84 PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); American Booksellers Foundation
v. Dean, 342 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 2003); ACLU V. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
85Am. LibrariesAssoc., 969 F. Supp. 170.
86 See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet:
Cutting Internet
Gambling's Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 63 (2010).
87 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 596
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the Court's cases have "struggled (to put it nicely) to develop
a set of rules by which [the court] may preserve a national market without necessarily intruding upon the
States' police powers, each exercise of which no doubt has some effect on the commerce of the
Nation.")
88Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
83
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outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently.'" 89
States can use their police powers to protect their citizens' health,
welfare, safety, and morals. 90 This power is broad and "the regulation of
gambling enterprises lies at the heart of the state's police power." 9' In
Posadasde Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme
Court recognized Puerto Rico's "interest in restricting advertising to reduce
the demand for casino gambling by Puerto Rico's residents and thus protect
their health, safety, and welfare" as a "substantial governmental interest." 92
Thus, in a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the finding that a legitimate
local interest is within the state's police power weighs heavily in favor of
the constitutionality of the regulation. However, as many cases
demonstrate, a finding that a regulation legitimately concerns a state's
protection of its citizens' health safety, welfare, and morals is not always
enough to survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.9 3
Neither the courts of appeals nor the Supreme Court have
entertained a case challenging a state gambling statute on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds. However, these types of cases have appeared in
state courts and federal district courts for some time. Recently, the
Washington Supreme Court heard a challenge to a law that banned all
Internet gambling, while allowing residents to enjoy "brick-and-mortar"
gambling.94 Rousso, an avid poker player, challenged Washington's ban on
Internet gambling alleging it violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The
Supreme Court of Washington disagreed and upheld the law.96 In doing so,
the court interpreted the statute as facially neutral because it "equally
prohibits Internet gambling regardless of whether the person or entity
hosting the game is located in Washington." 9 7 The plaintiff argued the law,
89 Id. (quoting
90

Police

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)).
Powers,

LEGAL

INFO.

INST.

(Aug.

19,

2010,

5:21

PM),

http://www.law.comell.edu/wex/police_powers.
91Johnson v. Collins Entm't Co., 199 F.3d 710, 720 (4th Cir. 1999).
92 Posdas De Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 329 (1986).
93 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005) (invalidating a law concerning
alcohol regulation); American Libraries Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.160, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(invalidating a law that was aimed at protecting minors from pedophiles).
94 Rousso v. Washington, 239 P.3d 1084, 1086 (Wash. 2010) (holding the law at issue
expressly permitted pari-mutuel wagering via the Internet despite the general Internet gambling ban).
9 Id. at 1087.
96 The Supreme Court of Washington expressly addresses American Libraries Assoc v.
Pataki and suggests that regulations of Internet gambling, comparable to those imposed on "brick-andmortar" gambling establishments would result in a major burden on commerce and distinguish the
current case by contending the Washington law is not "useless to address legitimate state interests" like
the NY law was in American LibrariesAssoc. v. Pataki. However, it is unlikely regulations would have
more of a burden on interstate commerce than an outright ban, which entirely precludes online gambling
operators from the Washington market. And the NY law in American Librarieswas not "useless," rather
the benefits did not outweigh the burden because of the low likelihood of accomplishing the statutory
purpose. Id. at 1092, 1094.
97
1d. at 1088.

2012-2013]

THE TEXAS RACING ACT

361

although facially neutral, was discriminatory in effect.98 The court rejected
this argument for two reasons. They first found that "Internet gambling and
brick-and-mortar gambling are two different activities." 99 The court then
reasoned that any alleged discriminatory impact is simply an indirect and
"secondary effect" of the legislation, which is not sufficient to establish that
the statute is discriminatory and subject the law to heightened scrutiny. 0o
The court did concede that, even though the law is not
discriminatory, it still resulted in a "considerable impact on interstate
commerce" and proceeded with the more lenient test from Pike v. Bruce
Church.' The court relied heavily upon the state's ability to regulate
gambling under their police powers and found the burden imposed by the
law is "comparable to the substantial state interest stemming from the
State's police power to protect the health, welfare, safety, and morals of its
citizens."1 0 2 Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court found the less
restrictive alternatives offered by the plaintiff would not allow Washington
to "clearly... avoid threats to health, welfare, safety, and morals posed by
Internet gambling equally as well in a manner that imposed less of a burden
on interstate commerce." 103 Thus the Washington ban on all Internet
gambling was not "clearly excessive" and did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.10
VI. THE CASE: CHURCHILLDOwNs INC. V. TROUT, ETAL.

A. The Texas Racing Act
The Texas Racing Act was amended in September 2011 to
specifically prohibit pari-mutuel wagering via the Internet.'0o The Act had
required wagering to be conducted "by an association within its enclosure"
since 1986, but did not specifically mention the Internet until amended in
2011.106 The Texas Racing Act provides: "a person may not accept, in
person, by telephone, or over the Internet, a wager for a horse race ...
conducted inside or outside this state from a person in this state unless the
wager is authorized."10 7 More specifically, § 11.011(f) states "nothing in
this Act is to be construed to allow wagering in Texas on simulcast races at
" Id at 1089.
99

Id.
' Id.
o' Id. at 1090.

Id.

102

.o31d. at 1091.
1052011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 522, §17 (H.B. 2271) (West).

'0 See 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 386 (H.B. 2263) (West) (leaving "within its
intact).
enclosure" language
107 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 179e, § 11.01(a) (West 2013).
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any location other than a racetrack licensed under this Act that has been
granted live race dates by the commission."108 Therefore, if someone in
Texas wishes to bet on a horse race, they must travel to a racetrack and
make their wager in person.
B. The Complaint
On September 21, 2012, Churchill Downs, Inc. brought suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief alleging the Texas Racing Act is
unconstitutional because it violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 109
Churchill Downs, the owner and operator of one of the largest ADW
websites, Twinspires.com, argues the Texas Racing Act is essentially an
"in-person" requirement, which are "inherently discriminatory against outof-state businesses." "o Churchill Downs concedes the Texas Racing Act is
facially neutral, but alleges the statute is discriminatory in its purpose and
effect. I" In support of their claim of discriminatory intent, Churchill
Downs asserts that the primary purpose of the legislation was to raise
revenue, citing statements made by legislators contained in the legislative
history.' 12 Churchill Downs also contends the Texas Racing Act has the
discriminatory effect of increasing market share for in-state horse tracks
while decreasing market-share for out-of-state tracks. 3 In sum, Churchill
Downs contends the Texas Racing Act and its physical presence
requirement "is discriminatory as a matter of Supreme Court precedent,
economic effect, and legislative intent."' "
C. The Answer
In response, the defendants claim the dormant Commerce Clause
should not apply for two reasons. First, defendants allege the discriminatory
impact of the Texas Racing Act, if any, is permissible because of federal
legislation. "1s Citing the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 and the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, defendants suggest
the federal laws' permissive attitude towards states "freely regulating" is
sufficient to remove the state law from the purview of the dormant
"os§ 11.011(0.
109Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-4, Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, et

al., No. 1:12-CV-00880, (W.D. Tex. 2012).
' 0 Brief for Plaintiffs at 5, Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, et al., No. 1:12-CV-00880 (W.D.
Tex. 2012).
I Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supranote 109, at 4.
12Id.
at 11-12.
113Id.
114Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 110, at 22.
" Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2-4, Churchill
Downs Inc. v. Trout, et al., No. 1:12-CV-00880, (W.D. Tex. 2012).
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Commerce Clause.' 16 Specifically, the defendants claim that the Interstate
Horseracing Act "defers to every State involved to determine legality."" 7
Defendants contend there are "two layers to IHA compliance with an
interstate off-track bet: (1) the wager must be legal in every state that is
involved and (2) the wager must comply with § 3004 ... "" This statutory
scheme begins with a "threshold inquiry" of "whether the interstate offtrack wager is 'lawful in each State involved"' and "if it is not, the IHA
does not even proceed to the secondary question of whether the appropriate
approvals and consents have been obtained." 1 9
Second, and in the alternative, the defendants argue the dormant Commerce
Clause is inapplicable because Churchill Downs is not "similarly situated"
with Texas tracks because they "serve different markets" and offer
"different products." 20
To counter Churchill Downs' main argument, defendants argue the
statute was not enacted with discriminatory purpose. 121 Rather, they assert
that the main impetus of the 2011 amendment was clarification of existing
law.122 Defendants also claim the Texas Racing Act would survive the Pike
v. Bruce Church test, arguing that in relation to the local benefit, the burden
imposed is not clearly excessive.1 23 The defendants contend that limiting
gambling is a "substantial and legitimate state purpose" and the burden on
Churchill Downs is not "clearly excessive" because it only forecloses ADW
operators from the Texas market.12 4 In addition, defendants claim that "the
link between the in-person requirement and the State's desire to protect the
public interest is evident from the regulatory scheme" and "any burden is
not significant in comparison to the benefits." 25
VII. ANALYSIS
A. Suggested Resolution of the Case
Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, et al., is now before the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Texas and presents a case of first
impression. Although the facts of Rousso v. Washington are similar, the
"61d. at 7-8.
1" Brief for Defendants at 6, Churchill Downs Inc. v. Trout, et al., No. 1:12-CV-00880
(W.D. Tex. 2012).
"' Id. at 7.

"1 Id.
120 Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 115, at
9.
121

Id. at 8-1.

122Id. at 6.
123Brief for
124

It.

Defendants, supra note I17, at 19.
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 115, at

125Brief for Defendants, supra note 117, at 20-21.
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Washington case is not controlling law. 126 Additionally, Washington's
statute banning Internet gambling expressly excluded pari-mutuel wagering
from the ban and, thus, the Western District of Texas should find the
Washington Supreme Court decision simply persuasive, at most.
Proceeding through established dormant Commerce Clause
analyses, the first question is whether the item or activity being regulated is
subject to Congress' commerce power. The Supreme Court's decision in
Champion v. Ames, which held a lottery ticket was a subject of interstate
commerce, 127 coupled with Congress' language in the Interstate
Horseracing Act of 1978 stating their intention to "regulate interstate
commerce with respect to wagering on horseracing,"l 28 makes it difficult to
argue that advance deposit wagering on horseracing is not subject to
Congress' commerce power. State or local laws that regulate pari-mutuel
wagers via the Internet are subject to Congress' plenary commerce
power.129 Therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause gives rise to a default
presumption that states are prohibited from erecting statutory barriers
against such economic activity.
The court must then consider what is likely the defendants'
strongest argument - that federal law permits the discriminatory impact of
Texas's law on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has held that
"Congress may redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce
by permitting the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would
otherwise not be permissible" 130 However, to allow such an effect,
Congress must "manifest its unambiguous intent."' 3 ' The Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 does not meet this highly specific
requirement. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
expressly states, "the term 'unlawful Internet gambling' shall not include
any activity that is allowed under the Interstate Horseracing Act of
1978. "'l32
On the other hand, the defendants' argument regarding the
Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 is much stronger. In enacting the IA,
Congress specifically stated its intention to "further the horseracing and
legal off-track betting industries in the Untied States" and to ensure that
each state has the "primary responsibility for determining what forms of
gambling may legally take place within their borders." 133 Recognizing that
126
127

See Rousso v. Washington, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010).
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903).

"' 15 USC §3001(b) (2011).
129 See Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Turfway Park
Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 F.3d 1406 (6 Cir. 1994).
no South Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
'3 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992).
132Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 § 801, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(D)(i)
(2006).
'n Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 USC §3001(a)(1) (1978).
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"unrestricted proliferation of off-track wagering would hurt the horseracing
industry by decreasing attendance at tracks, which, in turn, would reduce
the number of horses needed to compete and the number of individuals
employed in the industry," Congress "opted for the compromise found at 15
U.S.C. § 3004(a) which allows interstate off-track wagering if, and only if,
the interested parties consent."l 34
The statutory scheme established by Congress provides for a
"general federal prohibition of interstate off-track betting, set forth in 15
U.S.C. § 1303," which provides: "No person may accept an interstate offtrack wager except as provided in this chapter."' 5 Then, § 3004 serves as
an elaborate exception to the general prohibition, requiring the consent of
several parties as a "prerequisite to acceptance" of an interstate off-track
wager.
The Supreme Court considered a similar statutory scheme in
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 472 U.S. 159 (1985), where a general federal prohibition existed
but "the language of' § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
also known as the "Douglas Amendment," "plainly permit[ted] the States to
lift the federal ban entirely." 137 In response to a Commerce Clause
challenge, the Supreme Court determined that "the commerce power of
Congress [was] not dormant, but [had] been exercised by that body when it
enacted the Bank Holding Company Act and the Douglas Amendment to
the Act." 138 Consequently, the Supreme Court held that petitioners'
Commerce Clause attack failed because "the state actions which [Congress]
plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the
Commerce Clause." 39
However, the mere reference to the states' "responsibility for
determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within their
borders" contained in § 3001 of the Interstate Horseracing Act may be
insufficient to remove the law from the purview of the Commerce Clause.
There is a strong argument that this language is not unambiguously clear
that Congress intended the Interstate Horseracing Act to "plainly authorize"
the states' discrimination against interstate commerce.
Although it is true that if "Congress ordains that the states may
freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce," their laws concerning that
activity are "invulnerable to challenge" under the Commerce Clause; the
134 Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n,
Inc. v. Turfivay Park
Racing Ass'n, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1414-15.
us Id. at 1415.
36Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 USC § 3004(a) (1978).
13 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System,
472 U.S.
159, 169 (1985).

"' Id. at 174.
139 Id.
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defendants' reliance on this principle is likely misplaced. 140 When
Congress has intended to permit discrimination against interstate commerce
in other contexts, it has manifested its "unambiguous intent." For instance,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, enacted in 1945, was examined in Western
and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is
in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several
States.141
Unlike the clarity present in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Interstate
Horseracing Act of 1978 does not "evince a congressional intent to alter the
limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause." 142
Rather, the vague congressional finding in § 3001 of the IHA is more
similar to those provisions which courts have found insufficient to grant
states the authority to burden interstate commerce. For example, the
Supreme Court held that § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act, which provides
that the Act's provisions "shall not ... deprive a State or State commission
of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric
energy which is transmitted across a state line," was "in no sense an
affirmative grant of power to the states to burden interstate commerce in a
manner which would otherwise not be permissible." 143 Further, the
Supreme Court held the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which was enacted to "restore to the States" their police
powers to regulate alcohol, to "not displace the rule that States may not give
a discriminatory preference to their own producers." 44 Likewise, a court
would likely find the broad reference to states' authority to regulate
gambling in the IHA does not "confer upon the States an ability to restrict
the flow of interstate commerce that they would otherwise not enjoy." 4 5
The second threshold issue that must be resolved is the defendants'
suggestion that in-state brick-and-mortar racetracks are not "similarly
situated" to online ADW operators because they serve different markets and
40

W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981).
Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C § 1011 (2012); see also W. & S. Life Ins., 451

141McCarran-Ferguson

U.S. at 653.
142Wyoming

v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 458.
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982).
'" Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484-87 (2005).
145New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340 (citing Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27 (1980)).
1
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offer different products. 14 6 The court should reject this argument. Whether
the two conflicting entities are similarly situated depends on how the
respective activities are framed. In-state tracks offer live entertainment,
whereas online ADW operators do not. However, the activity at issue is the
off-track betting service. When viewed in this light, many in-state tracks,
which permit patrons to wager on races occurring elsewhere, offer the same
service as online ADW operators that allow those who wish to wager on
any horse race, to bet regardless of their geographic proximity to a specific
track. 14 7 Although the language of the Texas Racing Act does not hinge on
domicile, it should not be interpreted as simply regulating two dissimilar
business forms.148 Therefore, in-state racetracks and online ADW operators
are competitors, and the Texas Racing Act should be scrutinized under the
dormant Commerce Clause.
Since both threshold inquiries indicate the Commerce Clause
applies, the court should reach the merits of Churchill Downs' dormant
Commerce Clause argument. Whether or not the Texas Racing Act is found
to be discriminatory, it cannot survive inspection. Although § 11.01 of the
Texas Racing Act is not discriminatory on its face, there is a strong
argument it was enacted with a discriminatory purpose or, in the alternative,
has a discriminatory effect. Therefore, it should face the "virtually per se
rule of invalidity." 4 9
If a law is enacted with the legislative intent to discriminate against
out-of-state economic interests, the law is discriminatory. 5 Since the Fifth
Circuit has adopted the four-factor equal protection analysis from Arlington
Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp. to determine whether
the state has adopted a statute with a discriminatory purpose, each of these
factors should be considered with regard to the Texas Racing Act. 15
Defendants contend the most recent amendment to the Texas Racing Act
was aimed at simply clarifying the law, as evidenced by legislative history.
However, the court should focus not on the purpose of the most recent
amendment, which simply added the word "Internet," but instead focus on
the underlying purpose of the statute's requirement that wagers be placed
in-person at a racetrack.' 52
146Gen.

Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).
E.g., Simulcast, SAM HoUSTON RACE PARK, http://www.shrp.com/simulcast.html (last
visited Feb. 22, 2013).
148Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 161 (5th Cir. 2007).
49 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
ISO
See Allstate Ins. Co., 495 F.3d at 160.
"'

151Id.

152 House Transcript, April 8, 2011, TEx. TRIBUNE,
April 8, 2011,
http://www.texastribune.org/session/82R/transcripts/2011/4/8/house/ (quoting Representative Raphael
Anchi, "... And, frankly, it has been the current Texas Racing Act has been silent on internet gaming.
So while there are some rules promulgated, and it is suggested that internet gaming and taking bets from
Texas residents over the internet on racing by non Texas licensed entities it is illegal. This makes it clear
that it's illegal.").
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Applying the Arlington Heights factors to Texas's "in-person
requirement" indicates that the relevant section of the Texas Racing Act
was enacted with the intent to discriminate against out-of-state interests.
The first factor, whether a clear pattern of discrimination emerges from the
effect of the state action,'1 3 establishes a discriminatory purpose. A clear
pattern of discrimination emerges from the Texas Racing Act because the
ban effectively eliminates the ability for all out-of-state companies to accept
wagers from Texas residents. The second factor, the historical background
of the decision,' 5 4 also weighs in favor of finding discriminatory intent in
the Texas Racing Act. The Texas Racing Commission suggested multiple
times that the legislature adopt a law that legalized ADW, but the
legislature continued to allow only in-person pari-mutuel wagering that
took place at a racetrack. 55 The third factor, however, leans in favor of
finding there was not a discriminatory purpose behind the Texas Racing
Act. The specific sequence of events leading up to the legislative decision
did not include any departures from normal procedures.' 56 That is, there
was nothing anomalous about the legislative process of this statute. The
fourth factor, the legislative or administrative history15 also suggests a
discriminatory intent existed because contemporaneous statements by the
Texas legislators reveal a desire to favor in-state tracks and strong concerns
regarding the revenue of the Texas horseracing industry. In a short
exchange, the word "revenue" is mentioned among legislators twelve
times. 58 Although "stray protectionist remarks alone" are not sufficient to
demonstrate there was a discriminatory intent in enacting the legislation,
Churchill Downs' other circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory purpose
results in a sufficient showing to "condemn" the law as discriminatory.'" 9
Churchill Downs' alternative
argument concerning the
discriminatory effect of the statute is also convincing. Churchill Downs
must make a "substantial showing" to prove the Texas Racing Act results in
discriminatory effects. 160 The Texas Racing Act prohibits wagering on
horseracing unless the bet is placed in person at a facility that conducts live
racing.161 Despite the neutral wording and broad scope of the ban, the
statute's effect is to exclude all out-of-state companies from participating in
' See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68, 97
(1977); see also Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying
Arlington Heights factors to dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
1' Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 166-68.
' TEX. RACING COMM'N, STUDY OF THE CURRENT STATE OF HORSE AND GREYHOUND
RACING IN TEXAS AND INDUSTRY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT, at 14 (2011), available at

http://www.txrc.state.tx.us/agency/news/postings/Report-Current-State-of-Texas-Racing.pdf
06 Id.

' Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 166-68.
'5sE.g., House Transcript,April 8, 2011, supra note 135.
' See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 161 (5th Cir. 2007).
'6oSee Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1232 (9th Cir. 2010).
161TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 179e,

§ 11.01(a)

(West 2011).
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the Texas wagering market. The effect of § 11 of the Texas Racing Act is to
burden all out-of-state online ADW operators, who cannot legally accept
wagers on Texas races. Likewise, in-state tracks benefit from the statute,
requiring all persons wishing to wager to actually travel to a Texas
racetrack. In addition, a report prepared by the Texas Racing Commission
suggested that the amount of wagering that would occur if the state
legalized ADW wagers would be approximately $94 million, demonstrating
the importance of the Texas market.16 2 Therefore, the Texas Racing Act's
ban on Internet wagering will lead to an increased market share for in-state
tracks at the expense of out-of state tracks. This inequitable impact is a
sufficient showing to prove the Texas Racing Act is discriminatory in its
effect.
Even if found non-discriminatory, the Texas Racing Act cannot
pass the lenient test from Pike v. Bruce Church. The Texas Racing Act
undeniably burdens interstate commerce, even if "incidentally." Therefore,
it is subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny. Under the Pike test, the court
must answer two questions: (1) whether there is a legitimate local purpose
behind the statute; and (2) whether those local benefits are outweighed by
the burden placed on interstate commerce.
Considering the extensive discussion of economic issues in the
legislative history, it is conceivable the primary motivation for the Texas
Racing Act is protectionism. Although a court is hesitant to second-guess
the judgments of legislatures, the Supreme Court has specifically held "by
itself . . . revenue generation is not a local interest that can justify
discrimination against interstate commerce."16' However, the defendants'
contend the first part of this inquiry is satisfied because "limiting gambling"
is a legitimate and substantial local purpose.IM If proper regard is given to
the local purpose advanced by the defendants, it cannot be found that the
Texas Racing Act is "wholly irrational in light of its stated purposes." 65
Nevertheless, even the laudable goal of limiting gambling, which is
supported by the states' police power, cannot justify the burden the Texas
Racing Act places on interstate commerce. The nature of the interest at
stake determines the "extent of the burden that will be tolerated." 166
Although a state's attempt to protect their citizens' health, safety, and
morals is a substantial local interest, this fact alone is not dispositive. As
illustrated in American LibrariesAssoc v. Pataki and Granholm v. Heald, a
legitimate local concern is necessary, but not sufficient under a dormant
162 TEx.

RACING COMM'N,supra note 138, at 12.

C & A Carbone Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
'6 Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11, Churchill
Downs Inc. v. Trout, No. 1:12-cv-00880-LY (W.D. Tex. 2012).
165Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 680-81 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
166Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970).
163
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Commerce Clause analysis.167 The interests at stake in American Libraries,
protecting children from pedophiles, and Granholm v. Heald, keeping
alcohol out of minors' hands, are arguably more significant than Texas's
interest in limiting gambling. Thus, Texas's legitimate local purpose does
not outweigh the extreme burden on interstate commerce resulting from the
ban on all Internet wagering. Furthermore, there are several less restrictive
alternatives that would accomplish the state's goal of limiting gambling.
For example, the Texas Racing Commission itself suggested the Texas
legislature "pursue legislation that would allow ADWs in the state and set
up fair revenue sharing between the horsemen, greyhound owners, breeders,
Texas tracks and ADW operators." 16 8 Through cooperation, Texas and
ADW operators could establish gambling limits or appropriate safeguards
to ensure responsible wagering.
Ultimately, the provisions of the Texas Racing Act banning all
online pari-mutuel wagering and requiring all bets to be placed in person at
a racetrack cannot withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny, whether the law is
found to be discriminatory or not. Therefore, the federal district court for
the Western District of Texas should hold the Texas Racing Act
unconstitutional as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. Legislative Proposal
Much of the tension fueling the enactment of state laws banning
Internet wagering stems from the inherent competition between brick-andmortar racetracks and ADW operators. Racetracks rely on money wagered
to operate and provide lucrative purses to attract competitive racing.
However, handles have been decreasing industry-wide and are estimated to
be 28.9% lower than they were in 2003 when "total wagering on U.S. races
hit its high," at $15.2 billion.169
An understanding regarding Internet wagering laws must be
reached within the horseracing industry if the industry is to remain both
reputable and profitable. The most promising and viable option for
compromise is for industry leaders to come together with the goal of
drafting and proposing an interstate compact, complete with model
wagering legislation that avoids unconstitutional barriers to commerce.170
For example, the Racing Regulatory Compact, although it is not perfect,
167See

Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also
Graholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
168 TEX. RACING COMM'N, supra note 138, at 14.
169Matt Hegarty, Handle on U.S. Races Soars 18% in December; 2011 Handle Down 5.65%,
DAILY RACING FORM (Jan. 5, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.drf.com/news/handle-us-races-soars-18december-20 1-handle-down-565.
1o Tom LaMarra, State Legislators Told Compact Viable Option, BLOODHORSE (July 28,
2010, 9:36 AM), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/58101/state-legislators-told-compactviable-option.
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offers a strong starting point for progress.17 ' Although sacrifices must be
made on both sides, the possibility of uniform legislation ensures that
racetracks maintain the ability to operate and generate revenue, while also
decreasing obstacles for ADW operators to offer their service to a larger
market, providing stability to a struggling industry. There is much to be
gained by strengthening the horseracing industry, which is a small, but
important sector of the American economy, providing 460,000 full-time
equivalent jobs and a direct annual economic effect of $39 billion. 172
Through compromise and cooperation, the industry can reform and
revitalize.
VIII. CONCLUSION

As addressed above, the Texas Racing Act is unlikely to survive
this dormant Commerce Clause challenge because it discriminates against
out-of-state commerce in both its purpose and effect. This important case,
pending before the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas, clearly illustrates the problems arising between these two competing
factions of the horseracing industry. Despite their inherent competition for
wagering revenue, one's success does not necessarily come at the expense
of the other. In fact, online ADW operators' entire existence depends on
live racing. Likewise, the mobility and simplicity of advance deposit
wagering may attract new fans to horseracing. Therefore, a compromise
that benefits both sections of the industry is ideal.
While litigation can cure an unconstitutional law, the adoption of
an interstate compact, which could effectively deal with the issues created
by the advent of advance deposit wagering, is the better alternative for an
already-struggling industry. This small, yet distinct and important area of
the American economy faces a choice; continue down a self-destructive
path of state-by-state protectionism or unify to maximize revenues through
an interstate network of live racing and Internet-based wagering. The freeflow of wagering revenue could increase purses, ensure the viability of
racetracks, and ensure the popularity of horseracing for years to come.

1'

2010).

See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 230.3761 (West 2011); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-60-202(5) (West

12AM. HORSE COUNCIL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE U.S. HORSE INDUSTRY,

2005, available at http://www.horsecouncil.org/national-economic-impact-us-horse-industry.

